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Abstract: Analysis of credibility is a reverse-Bayes technique that has
been proposed by Matthews (2001) to overcome some of the short-
comings of significance tests. A significant result is deemed credible
if current knowledge about the effect size is in conflict with any scep-
tical prior that would make the effect non-significant. In this paper
I formalize the approach and propose to use Bayesian predictive tail
probabilities to quantify the evidence for credibility. This gives rise to
a p-value for extrinsic credibility, taking into account both the internal
and the external evidence for an effect. The assessment of intrinsic
credibility leads to a new threshold for ordinary significance that is
remarkably close to the recently proposed 0.005 level. Finally, a p-
value for intrinsic credibility is proposed that is a simple function of
the ordinary p-value for significance and has a direct frequentist in-
terpretation in terms of the replication probability that a future study
under identical conditions will give an estimated effect in the same
direction as the first study.
KeyWords: Analysis of Credibility; Confidence Interval; p-value; Rep-
lication Probability; Significance Test
1 Introduction
“p-values are just too familiar and useful to ditch”
David Spiegelhalter (2017)
Standard P-values for point null hypotheses still dominate most of the applied literat-
ure (Greenland and Poole, 2013), despite the fact that they are commonly misused and
misunderstood (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016; Matthews et al., 2017). Although being
criticised intensively in the literature, the dichotomisation of P-values into “signific-
ant” and “non-significant” is still commonplace in practice.
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In a series of papers, Robert Matthews Matthews (2001a,b, 2017) has developed the
Analysis of Credibility, a specific reverse-Bayes method to assess the credibility of a
significant finding. Reverse-Bayes approaches allow to study properties of the prior
distribution needed to achieve a certain posterior statement for the data at hand. The
idea to use Bayes’s theorem in reverse originates in the work by IJ Good (Good, 1983)
and is increasingly used to assess the plausibility of scientific findings (Greenland,
2006, 2011; Held, 2013; Colquhoun, 2017).
Analysis of credibility is based on a conventional confidence interval for an un-
known effect size θ with lower limit L and upper limit U, say. In the following I
assume that both L and U are symmetric around the point estimate θˆ (assumed to
be normally distributed) and that both are either positive or negative, i. e. the effect is
significant at significance level α. Matthews (2001a,b) proposed to compute a sceptical
prior distribution for the effect size θ, normal with mean zero, that - combined with
the information given in the confidence interval for θ - results in a posterior distribu-
tion which is just non-significant at level α, i. e. either the α/2 or the 1− α/2 posterior
quantile is zero. He has derived a formula for the limits ±S of the corresponding
equi-tailed prior credible interval at the same level 1− α:
S =
(U − L)2
4
√
UL
, (1)
where S is called the sceptical limit and the interval [−S, S] is called the critical prior
interval. Note that (1) holds for any value of α, not just for the traditional 5% level.
Equivalently, the variance τ2 of the sceptical prior can be expressed as a function of
the variance σ2 (the squared standard error, assumed to be known) of the estimate θˆ,
the corresponding test statistic t = θˆ/σ and zα/2, the 1− α/2 quantile of the standard
normal distribution:
τ2 =
σ2
t2/z2α/2 − 1
, (2)
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where t2 > z2α/2 is required for significance at level α. Equation (2) shows that the
prior variance τ2 can be both smaller or larger than σ2, depending on the value of t2.
If t2 is close to z2α/2 (i. e. the effect is “borderline significant”), then the prior variance
will be relatively large. If t2 is substantially larger than z2α/2, then the prior variance
will be relatively small.
For illustration, consider results from a recently published randomized placebo-
controlled clinical trial (Hayward et al., 2017) on the efficacy of corticosteroids in the
treatment of sore throat. There were 102/288 events in the intervention group and
75/277 events in the control group for the outcome complete resolution of pain at 48
hours. A relative risk of exp(θˆ) = 1.31 can easily be calculated (95% CI from 1.02 to
1.68, p = 0.034). Analysis of credibility for the log relative risk θ gives the sceptical
limit 0.60 = log(1.83), so the critical prior interval is from 1/1.83 = 0.55 to 1.83 on the
relative risk scale. The associated standard deviation τ = 0.31 of the sceptical prior is
considerably larger than the standard error σ = 0.13. Figure 1 displays the sceptical
prior together with the confidence interval for the data and the associated posterior.
Matthews (2001b) proposed to compare external knowledge about effect sizes with the
sceptical limit S:
If previous evidence indicates that plausible values for the parameter in ques-
tion exist outside the critical prior interval (CPI), the reality of the stated
effect may be deemed credible [. . .].
In the above example, extrinsic credibility of the Hayward et al. (2017) results can
be investigated in the light of preceding trials on the same clinical research question.
Sadeghirad et al. (2017) performed a systematic review and identified three preceding
studies relevant for the Hayward et al. (2017) analysis. A random-effects meta-analysis
of the three trials preceding the Hayward (2017) study gives a relative risk estimate of
1.63 (95% CI from 1.31 to 2.02, p < 0.0001), also shown in Figure 1. Since the external
point estimate is smaller than the sceptical limit 1.83, the results from the Hayward
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Figure 1: Analysis of credibility for the relative risk of complete resolution of pain at
48 hours as reported in the Hayward et al. (2017) trial. The sceptical prior
for the relative risk θ has 95% credible interval from 0.55 to 1.83. Combined
with the data represented by the 95% confidence interval from 1.02 to 1.68,
the resulting equi-tailed 95% posterior credible interval has lower limit 1.
The external data is based on a meta-analysis of preceding trials. The p-
value pE for extrinsic credibility is discussed in Section 2.1. The p-value pI
for intrinsic credibility is discussed in Section 3.2.
et al. (2017) study are not considered credible (at the 95% confidence level) using the
Matthews (2001b) approach.
This approach seems somewhat unsatisfactory, since the dichotomisation into cred-
ible or not credible seems too simplistic, just as the dichtomisation into significant and
non-significant. Instead, a quantitative measure of credibility seems warranted. To this
end I propose a more formal assessment of credibility based on the Box (1980) pro-
posal to quantify prior-data conflict with a Bayesian tail probability (Section 2). This
gives rise to a p-value for extrinsic credibility, taking into account both the internal
and the external evidence for a significant effect, see Section 2.1. The assessment of
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intrinsic credibility is described in Section 3, where a new justification for the recently
proposed 0.005 threshold for significance is given (Section 3.1). A new p-value for
intrinsic credibility is introduced in Section 3.2 and interpreted as a replication prob-
ability in Section 3.3. I investigate the distribution of p-values for credibility under the
assumption of no effect (Section 4), and close with some comments in Section 5.
2 Assessing evidence for extrinsic credibility
In the present context the prior is the sceptical prior and the data are derived from
the external study used to assess credibility. The sceptical prior is normal with mean
zero and variance τ2. The likelihood of the external information on the effect size θ
can usually be described as normal with mean θˆ0 and variance σ20 , say. The Box (1980)
approach is now based on the prior-predictive distribution, which is normal with
mean zero and variance τ2 + σ20 (Spiegelhalter et al., 2004, Section 5.8). The procedure
computes the test statistic
tBox =
θˆ0√
τ2 + σ20
(3)
and finally the (two-sided) tail probability
pBox = Pr(χ2(1) ≥ t2Box) (4)
as the corresponding upper tail of a χ2-distribution with one degree of freedom. Small
values of pBox indicate a conflict between the sceptical prior and the external data. Note
that this procedure is different from the assessment of compatibility of the current
study with the external study - then we would use the test statistic (θˆ0 − θˆ)/
√
σ2 + σ20 ,
which will give small tail probabilities whenever the results from the two studies are
incompatible, independent of whether the trials show evidence for an effect or not.
The proposed assessment of conflict between the sceptical prior derived from the
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95% confidence interval and the meta-analytic summary estimates from the preceding
three trials gives tBox = 1.49 with Box’s tail probability pBox = 0.14. However, this
tail probability depends on α through τ2 as given in (2), here 5%. For example, for
α = 10%, Box’s tail probability is considerably smaller (pBox = 0.004). This is because
the lower limit of the 90% confidence interval is further away from the null than the
lower limit of the 95% confidence interval, so we need a smaller prior variance τ2 to
push it to zero. A smaller τ2 results in a larger test statistic (3), hence a smaller tail
probability (4). In practice, however, it is difficult to interpret tail probabilities for cred-
ibility that depend on the confidence level 1− α of the underlying confidence interval.
Furthermore, computation of pBox is not possible if the result from the underlying
study is not significant at level α. These issues motivate the work described in the next
section where I define a p-value for extrinsic credibility, independent of the level α.
2.1 A p-value for extrinsic credibility
There are two disadvantages of the procedure described in the previous section: First,
the tail probability pBox for extrinsic credibility depends on the confidence level 1− α
of the underlying confidence interval. Secondly, pBox only exists if the confidence in-
terval does not include zero, i. e. is significant at level α. To address both problems,
I suggest to determine the largest confidence level 1 − α, where the stated effect is
(just) extrinsically credible at level 1− α, in analogy to the usual assessment of signi-
ficance based on confidence intervals. The required level α will be called the p-value
for extrinsic credibility, denoted by pE.
To determine pE, let c = σ2/σ20 denote the ratio of the variances of the internal and
external effect estimates. With (2) we then have
τ2 + σ20 = σ
2
0
(
c
t2/z2α/2 − 1
+ 1
)
.
7
Using (3), the requirement t2Box ≥ z2α/2 for extrinsic credibility is then equivalent to(
t20
z2α/2
− 1
)(
t2
z2α/2
− 1
)
≥ c, (5)
here t0 = θˆ0/σ0 is the test statistic of the external study. The required level α = pE to
obtain equality in (5) can easily be computed numerically. Note that (2) requires t2 >
z2pE/2 to hold, so also t
2
0 > z
2
pE/2
must hold to have the left side of (5) being positive. In
other words, pE will be larger than both ordinary (two-sided) p-values for significance
p = 2 [1−Φ(t)] and p0 = 2 [1−Φ(t0)], say, from the internal and the external data,
respectively, here Φ(.) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function.
Figure 2 shows the dependence of pE on p, p0 and c. Note that pE remains un-
changed if we switch t0 and t but keep c fixed. This does not mean that switching the
role of the external and internal data will not change pE as then c would also change,
except for the case c = 1, where σ2 = σ20 holds. For fixed t and t0, pE is increasing
with c, so the evidence for extrinsic credibility decreases with increasing variance ratio
σ2/σ20 if the two test statistics t and t0 (and the associated ordinary p-values) are kept
constant. If c is small, then pE will be close to max{p0, p}, see Figure 2. If p0  p,
then pE will be close to p.
In the above example we obtain pE = 0.062 by numerical computation. If we think
of p-values as indicators of the strength of evidence and adopt the “rough and ready
guide” by Bland (2015, Section 9.4), then pE = 0.062 indicates weak evidence for
credibility of the results from the Hayward et al. (2017) trial in the light of the three
preceding trials. A more technical interpretation is that for a confidence level of 1−
pE = 93.8% for the log relative risk obtained from the Hayward et al. (2017) trial, Box’s
tail probability (4), quantifying the conflict between the corresponding sceptical prior
and the external summary estimate, is equal to pE = 0.062.
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Figure 2: The p-value for extrinsic credibility as a function of the ordinary p-values
p and p0 of the internal and external studies. Shown are contour plots for
different values of the variance ratio c.
Note that the check θ0 > S for credibility by Matthews (2001b) can be re-written as
θ20/τ
2 ≥ z2α/2 and leads to the requirement
t20
z2α/2
(
t2
z2α/2
− 1
)
≥ c. (6)
This is different from (5) and no longer requires t20 > z
2
α/2. Specifically, if c < 1, it may
happen that Matthews’ check will declare a significant result as extrinsically credible,
although the external study was not conventionally significant on its own right.
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3 Assessing evidence for intrinsic credibility
A significant effect is intrinsically credible, if it is in conflict with any sceptical prior
that would make the effect non-significant. This can be thought of as a double-check
to ensure that a significant effect is not spurious. Matthews (2017) proposed to declare
an effect as intrinsically credible, if the internal estimate θˆ is outside the sceptical prior
interval −S to S. He shows that, for α = 0.05, this is equivalent to the conventional
two-sided p-value being smaller than 0.0127.
However, Matthews’ check for intrinsic credibility does not take the uncertainty of
θˆ directly into account. One could argue that the sceptical prior variance (2) is already
a function of the variance σ2, so the uncertainty of θˆ is already implicitly taken into
account in the calculation of the sceptical limit. This is true, but - for fixed σ2 - the
point estimate θˆ also affects the sceptical limit, so Matthews’ check does use θˆ twice.
It is not clear why θˆ can be used twice, but not σ2. In what follows I will use both θˆ
and σ2 directly in the assessment of intrinsic credibility, following the approach by Box
(1980) for the assessment of prior-data conflict, with the perhaps unusual feature that
the prior has been derived from the data. I argue that there is nothing intrinsically
inconsistent in investigating the compatibility of a prior, defined through the data,
and the data itself, extending a argument made by Cox (2006, Section 5.10) to the
reverse-Bayes setting.
3.1 Another justification for the 0.005 threshold
If we use the Box (1980) check for prior-data conflict between the sceptical prior and
the original (internal) data with point estimate θˆ and variance σ2, the test statistic (3)
reads
tBox =
θˆ√
τ2 + σ2
. (7)
Intrinsic credibility at the 5% level (i. e. |tBox| > 1.96) can then be shown to be equi-
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valent to the conventional two-sided p-value p < 0.0056. This is remarkably close to
the recently proposed new threshold of 0.005 for statistical significance (Johnson, 2013;
Benjamin et al., 2017).
To derive the new significance threshold, set c = 1 and t0 = t in (5) to obtain the
simple requirement
t2 ≥ 2 z2α/2 (8)
for intrinsic credibility at level α. In (8), t is the ordinary test statistic t = θˆ/σ, so the
intrinsic credibility threshold αI for the conventional two-sided p-value is
αI = 2
{
1−Φ
(
t =
√
2 zα/2
)}
. (9)
For α = 0.05 we have t =
√
2 · 1.96 = 2.77 and the credibility threshold (9) turns out to
be αI = 0.0056, as claimed above. Figure 3 compares the new threshold with the one
obtained by Matthews (2017, Appendix D) (using t = 1.272 zα/2) for values of α below
10%.
The squared test statistic (7) can also be written in terms of L and U,
t2Box = z
2
α/2
4 UL
(U − L)2 ,
and the requirement t2Box ≥ z2α/2 for intrinsic credibility can be shown to be equivalent
to require that the credibility ratio U/L (or L/U if both L and U are negative) fulfills
U
L
≤ d = 3+ 2
√
2 ≈ 5.828. (10)
Thus, there is a simple way to assess intrinsic credibility based on the ratio of the
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Figure 3: The threshold for intrinsic credibility of significant results as a function of the
conventional α level. The blue line corresponds to the proposal by Matthews
(2017). The red line is the proposed new threshold.
limits of a confidence interval at any level 1− α, without using the ordinary p-value
for significance: if the credibility ratio is smaller than d = 5.828 than the result is
credible at level 1 − α. Note that this is a stronger requirement than the check of
confidence intervals for significance, where it is only required that the credibility ratio
is positive. To derive the cut-point d in (10), set U = L d so the requirement t2Box = z
2
α/2
is equivalent to
1 =
4 UL
(U − L)2 =
4 d
(d− 1)2 ,
a quadratic equation in d with d = 3+ 2
√
2 as solution.
If the sceptical prior distribution is already available, then another way to assess
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intrinsic credibility is to compare the prior variance τ2 to the data variance σ2. Com-
paring (2) with (8) it is easy to see that intrinsic credibility is achieved if and only if
the sceptical prior variance is not larger than the variance of the estimate, i. e. τ2 ≤ σ2.
3.2 A p-value for intrinsic credibility
As for the p-value for extrinsic credibility introduced in Section 2.1, I now derive the α
value that just achieves intrinsic credibility, i. e. where equality holds in (8). This gives
the p-value for intrinsic credibility, denoted by pI . The p-value for credibility will always
be larger than the p-value for significance, which is based on the confidence level 1− α
such that the lower limit L is exactly zero.
The p-value pI for intrinsic credibility can be written as a function of the ordinary
p-value p for significance:
pI = 2
[
1−Φ
(
t/
√
2
)]
, (11)
here t = t(p) = Φ−1(1− p/2) is the standard test statistic for significance. Equation
(11) can be derived by solving equation (9) for α = pI and replacing αI with p. Note
that the corresponding test statistic tI = t/
√
2 for intrinsic credibility is just a shrunken
version of the test statistic t for significance.
Figure 4 shows that the p-value pI for intrinsic credibility is considerably larger than
the p-value p for significance, particularly for small values of p. For example, the p-
value for intrinsic credibility of the Hayward et al. (2017) study is pI = 0.13, whereas
the conventional p-value for significance is p = 0.034.
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Figure 4: The p-value for intrinsic credibility as a function of the p-value for signific-
ance. The grey dashed line is the identity line.
3.3 Interpretation as replication probability
The p-value for intrinsic credibility has a direct and useful interpretation in terms
of the replication probability that an identical study will give an estimated effect θˆ2
in the same direction as the estimate θˆ1 = θˆ from the current (first) study. To see
this, note that under an initial uniform prior the posterior for θ is θ | θˆ1 ∼ N(θˆ1, σ2).
This posterior now serves as the prior for the mean of the (unobserved) estimate
θˆ2 | θ ∼ N(θ, σ2) from the second study, where we assumed the two studies to be
identically designed, so with equal variances σ2. This leads to the prior-predictive dis-
tribution θˆ2 | θˆ1 ∼ N(θˆ1, 2 σ2) and the p-value for intrinsic credibility (11) is then twice
the probability that the second study will give an estimate θˆ2 in the opposite direction
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as the estimate θˆ1 of the first study:
2 Pr(θˆ2 ≤ 0 | θˆ1 > 0) = 2Φ
(
0− θˆ1√
2σ
)
= 2Φ
(
−t/
√
2
)
= 2
[
1−Φ
(
t/
√
2
)]
= pI ,
and vice versa if θˆ1 < 0. The probability Pr(θˆ2 ≤ 0 | θˆ1 > 0) is one of the three
replication probabilities that have been considered by Senn (2002). A related, but
different quantity has been calculated by Goodman (1992), the probability that the
result from the second study is significant.
4 The distribution under the null
It is of interest to study the distribution of pI and pE under the assumption of no
effect. Then p is uniformly distributed and we can derive the density of pI with a
change-of-variables using (11):
f (pI) = 2
√
pi ϕ {t(pI)} ,
here ϕ(.) is the standard normal density function and t(pI) = Φ−1(1− pI/2). The
density functions of p and pI are compared in Figure 5. Under the assumption of no
effect, the risk of small p-values for intrinsic credibility is drastically reduced, com-
pared to standard p-values for significance.
The distribution of pE can be easily studies via simulation. Histograms of 50 000
samples is displayed in Figure 6 for the same values of d as in Figure 6. The distribu-
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Figure 5: The density function of the p-value for significance and the p-value for in-
trinsic credibility under the assumption of no effect.
tion of pE is shifted to the right with increasing c. For c→ 0 we have pE → min{p, p0},
which follows a rectangular Be(2, 1) distribution under the assumption that p and p0
are independently uniform. For comparison, Figure 6 also gives the density func-
tion of the p-value for significance and for intrinsic credibility. Under the assump-
tion of no effect, the risk of small “false positive” p-values for credibility is drastic-
ally reduced, compared to standard p-values for significance. This is already to see
for pI , but even more pronounced for pE. The rectangular distribution (for c → 0)
gives an upper bound for the tail probability Pr(pE < α |H0) ≤ α2 for any threshold
α < 0.5 and for any value of the variance ratio c. For example, for α = 0.05 we obtain
Pr(pE < 0.05 |H0) ≤ 0.0025. For comparison, Pr(pI < 0.05 |H0) = 0.0056.
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Figure 6: Histograms of the distribution of the p-value for extrinsic credibility for dif-
ferent values of c under the assumption of no effect. The density function
of the p-value for extrinsic credibility for the limiting case c = 0 is superim-
posed (blue line), as well as the density function of the p-value for intrinsic
credibility (red line) and for significance (black line).
5 Discussion
In this paper I have introduced p-values to assess extrinsic and intrinsic credibility.
The p-value for extrinsic credibility is a function of the two ordinary p-values from the
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internal and external data and the ratio of the squared standard errors of the internal
and external effect estimates only. The p-value for intrinsic credibility has been shown
to be function of the ordinary p-value for significance from the internal data.
The proposed p-values for credibility are always larger than the corresponding p-
values for significance. As such, they provide a new calibration of ordinary P-values.
For the conventional α = 0.05 level, the threshold for intrinsic credibility turns out to
be remarkably close to the recently proposed 0.005 significance level, which has been
proposed based on different arguments.
Although derived using a Bayesian approach, p-values for credibility do not require
specification of a prior probability of the null hypothesis of no effect. In practice it
is therefore easy to accompany p-values for significance with the corresponding p-
values for credibility. This is in contrast to the calibration of p-values to lower bounds
on posterior probability of the null, which require specification of a prior probability.
However, it is noteworthy that the p-value for intrinsic credibility is surprisingly close
to a commonly used bound on the posterior probability of the null hypothesis (of no
effect) (Sellke et al., 2001) under the condition of equipoise (Johnson, 2013). Minimum
Bayes factors have also been proposed to calibrate p-values, see Held and Ott (2018)
for a recent review. They have the advantage that they do not require specification of a
prior probability of the null hypothesis, but they cannot be interpreted as probabilities.
The analysis of credibility assumes a simple mathematical framework, where likeli-
hood, prior and posterior are all normally distributed. It will be of interest to extend
this approach to other settings, for example to the t-distribution.
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